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Issue I

COURTREPORTS

wetland hydrology in the area where the Deatons excavated the
drainage ditch dirt onto wetlands. The court dismissed this argument
by deferring to the Corps' use of visual observation in its
determination that water saturated the ground within twelve inches of
the surface.
Finally, the Deatons disputed the district court's remediation order
requiring them to fill in the drainage ditch. The Deatons argued the
CWA only regulated the deposit of excavated dirt into wetlands, not
the taking of dirt from them. The Deatons claimed the proper remedy
was to remove the dirt to a non-wetlands portion of the property. The
court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in the
remediation order because of the district court's findings that (1)
removing the excavated dirt to another part of the property would do
more environmental harm, and (2) requiring the Deatons to move the
dirt would allow the Deatons to benefit from the CWA violations.
Thus, the court sustained the remediation order.
JamesParrot

SIXTH CIRCUIT
United States v. City of Detroit, 329 F.3d 515 (6thCir. 2003) (holding:
(1) Administrative Procedure Act can waive sovereign immunity for
non-monetary claims even in cases brought under different statutes;
(2) consentjudgment between federal government and municipality
imposed obligations pursuant to law serving as basis for entry of
injunction under All Writs Act; (3) Administrative Procedure Act
provided jurisdiction for suit in absence of exceptional circumstances;
and (4) Corps decision requiring environmental assessment must be
reviewed under arbitrary and capricious standard).
Pursuant to a consent judgment between the City of Detroit
("Detroit") and the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"),
Detroit was obligated to dredge and dispose of sediment from Conner
Creek contaminated by discharges from the city's sewage treatment
facility. Detroit sought a declaratory judgment from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ordering the Corps
to accept dredge material from Conner Creek at a confined disposal
facility it was operating on behalf of the State of Michigan ("State").
The district court issued an injunction requiring the Corps to accept
the Connor Creek sediment to prevent frustration of the consent
judgment. The Corps appealed, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order and
issued an unpublished opinion that the district court both lacked the
authority and abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. Detroit
then filed a petition for rehearing. The court granted the petition,
reheard the case, held the district court had the authority to bind the
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Corps to an injunction to prevent the frustration of the consent
judgment, and remanded the case on two issues.
First, the Sixth Circuit examined whether sovereign immunity
precluded Detroit's declaratory judgment claim and held that under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the government waived its
immunity from non-monetary claims. The Sixth Circuit also held that
waiver of sovereign immunity under the APA can be applied in cases
brought under statutes other than the APA. Therefore, even though
Detroit did not bring its original claim under the APA, the Sixth
Circuit found the federal government had waived sovereign immunity
because the remedy sought was non-monetary.
Second, the Sixth Circuit investigated whether the district court
properly relied on the All Writs Act ("AWA") for asserting its
jurisdiction in the matter. The court noted that Detroit could have
brought this suit under the APA but instead relied on securing a
remedy through the AWA. The court relied on a recent United States
Supreme Court ruling that exceptional circumstances can prove the
inadequacy of the properly applied statue, thus providing a proper
case for application of the AWA. Because the district court failed to
consider whether Detroit should have brought the suit under the APA,
or if exceptional circumstances allowed the claim to be brought under
the AWA, the court remanded for determination of APA applicability.
Next, the court of appeals determined whether the district court
had the power under the AWA to issue the injunction compelling the
Corps to accept for disposal the dredged Conner Creek materials, and
noted that the AWA authorizes federal courts to issue commands
necessary to prevent the frustration of orders previously issued-a
power that extends to nonparties in certain situations. The consent
judgment against Detroit imposed legal obligations pursuant to the
AWA. Because the AWA makes no distinction between consent
judgments and orders, the court held that the district court had the
authority to issue the injunctive order under the AWA.
Finally the Sixth Circuit determined whether the district court
abused its discretion when issuing the injunction against the Corps by
evaluating four factors used to determine whether a writ issued to a
nonparty under the AWA lies within a district court's discretion, along
with an additional fifth factor for review asserted by the Corps. The
factors included: (1) the nonparty's relationship to the controversy,
(2) the burden cooperation would impose on the nonparty, (3) the
nonparty's interest in not providing assistance, (4) the importance of
the nonparty's assistance to fulfilling the goals of the order, and (5)
whether the district's court order was agreeable to usages and
principles of law.
With respect to the first and third factors the court held the Corps
was in a position to assist and had a substantial interest in taking care
of the contamination in a timely matter. Consequently, the court
concluded the Corps was not so far removed for assistance to be
compelled, and it did not possess a substantial interest in
noncompliance with the writ. As to the second factor the court
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determined that compliance with the writ would not impose a
substantial burden upon the Corps because Detroit agreed to both pay
all costs associated with disposal and indemnify the Corps for any
additional liability. With respect to the fourth factor, the court held
that the Corps' assistance was necessary because of the lack of feasible
alternatives and exigent circumstances. Finally, with regard to the fifth
factor the Corps argued that the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") required an environmental study even though the district
court found otherwise. The Sixth Circuit then held that to review the
Corps claim the district court should have applied the arbitrary and
capricious standard. Because the district court did not apply this
standard to the instant case, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to
determine whether the Corps decision to perform an environmental
assessment was arbitrary and capricious.
Karen L. Golan

United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding
wetlands adjacent to a drain and hydrologically connected to navigable
waters established jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act).
John Rapanos owned one hundred and seventy-five acres of land in
Bay County, Michigan. Wetlands on the property, which were the
subject of this dispute, lie between eleven and twenty miles from the
nearest navigable-in-fact water. In 1988, Rapanos made plans to clear
the trees from the land and eradicate the wetlands on his property. In
an effort to sell the plot to developers, Rapanos proceeded to destroy
wetlands that thrived on his property. The Michigan Department of
Natural Resources ("Department") informed him that a permit would
be necessary for development on the area. Later, Rapanos sought to
destroy any paper evidence that reported wetlands on his property.
Despite Department and Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
warnings, Rapanos began destroying the wetlands. The EPA charged
Rapanos with knowingly discharging pollutants into the waters of the
United States without a permit-a violation of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The EPA alleged that these wetlands were connected to
"navigable waters," which the CWA protects. Rapanos argued that the
wetlands on his land were not "navigable waters" because they are not
directly adjacent to navigable waters. Rapanos' first trial ended in a
mistrial and the second trial in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan concluded with a guilty verdict. After
granting Rapanos' motion for a new trial, the district court found that
the court committed plain error. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed this holding, remanding the case to the
district court for sentencing. The district court sentenced Rapanos to
three years probation and a fine of $185,000. After appealing the
conviction, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit, which remanded back to the

